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Eye Movements in Strategic Choice
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ABSTRACT
In risky and other multiattribute choices, the process of choosing is well described by random walk or drift diffusion models in which evidence
is accumulated over time to threshold. In strategic choices, level-k and cognitive hierarchy models have been offered as accounts of the choice
process, in which people simulate the choice processes of their opponents or partners. We recorded the eye movements in 2 × 2 symmetric
games including dominance-solvable games like prisoner’s dilemma and asymmetric coordination games like stag hunt and hawk–dove. The
evidence was most consistent with the accumulation of payoff differences over time: we found longer duration choices with more ﬁxations
when payoffs differences were more ﬁnely balanced, an emerging bias to gaze more at the payoffs for the action ultimately chosen, and that
a simple count of transitions between payoffs—whether or not the comparison is strategically informative—was strongly associated with the
ﬁnal choice. The accumulator models do account for these strategic choice process measures, but the level-k and cognitive hierarchy models do
not. © 2015 The Authors. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
key words eye tracking; process tracing; experimental games; normal-form games; prisoner’s dilemma; stag hunt; hawk–dove; level-k;
cognitive hierarchy; drift diffusion; accumulator models; gaze cascade effect; gaze bias effect
When we make decisions, the outcomes that we receive often
depend not only on our own choices but also on the choices of
others. The related cognitive hierarchy and level-k theories
are perhaps the best developed accounts of reasoning in
strategic decisions. In these models, people choose by best
responding to their simulation of the reasoning of others. In
parallel, in the literature on risky and multiattribute choices,
drift diffusion models have been developed. In these models,
evidence accumulates until it hits a threshold and a choice is
made. In this paper, we consider this family of models as an
alternative to the level-k-type models, using eye movement
data recorded during strategic choices to help discriminate
between these accounts. We ﬁnd that while the level-k and
cognitive hierarchy models can account for the choice data
well, they fail to accommodate many of the choice time and
eyemovement process measures. In contrast, the drift diffusion
models account for the choice data, and many of their signature
effects appear in the choice time and eye movement data.
LEVEL-K THEORY
Level-k theory is an account of why people should, and do,
respond differently in different strategic settings. In the
simplest level-k model, each player best responds assuming
that everyone else is one level of reasoning behind them
(Costa-Gomes & Crawford, 2006; Nagel, 1995). To reason
up to level k1 for other players means, by deﬁnition, that
one is a level-k player. A simple starting point is that level-
0 players choose randomly from the available strategies. A
level-1 player is assumed to best respond under the assump-
tion that everyone else is a level-0 player. A level-2 player is
assumed to best respond under the assumption that everyone
else is a level-1 player. More generally, a level-k player best
responds to a level k1 player. This approach has been gen-
eralized by assuming that each player chooses assuming that
their opponents are distributed over the set of simpler strate-
gies (Camerer et al., 2004; Stahl & Wilson, 1994, 1995).
Thus, a level-2 player is assumed to best respond to a mixture
of level-0 and level-1 players. More generally, a level-k
player best responds based on their beliefs about the distribu-
tion of other players over levels 0 to k1. By ﬁtting the
choices from experimental games, estimates of the propor-
tion of people reasoning at each level have been constructed.
Typically, there are few k = 0 players, mostly k=1 players,
some k=2 players, and not many players following other
strategies (Camerer et al., 2004; Costa-Gomes & Crawford,
2006; Nagel, 1995; Stahl & Wilson, 1994, 1995).
These models make predictions about the cognitive pro-
cessing involved in strategic decision making, and experi-
mental economists and psychologists have begun to test
these predictions using process-tracing methods like eye
tracking or Mouselab (where participants must hover the
mouse over information to reveal it). What sort of eye
movements or lookups are predicted by a level-k strategy?
Information acquisition predictions for level-k theory
We illustrate the predictions of level-k theory with a 2 × 2
symmetric game taken from our experiment (Figure 1a). Two
players must each choose a strategy, with their payoffs deter-
mined by their joint choices. We will describe games from
the point of view of a player choosing between top and bottom
rows who faces another player choosing between left and right
columns. For example, in this game, if the row player chooses
top and the column player chooses right, then the row player
receives a payoff of 30, and the column player receives 60.
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Figure 2 illustrates the payoff information needed at each
stage for different levels of level-k reasoning, following
Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta (2001). A level-0
player chooses randomly and could do this with his or her
eyes closed! A level-1 player best responds to the random
choice of a level-0 player. This means that he or she must
view his or her own payoffs, highlighted in red in the level-
1 row of Figure 2, to select the action with the highest
expected payoff. A level-2 row player must ﬁrst simulate
the column player using level-1 reasoning. A level-1 column
player will look up his or her own payoffs and determine
which column offers the higher expected payoff under the
assumption of a level-0 row player choosing a row randomly.
Having identiﬁed the choice of his or her level-1 column
playing opponent, the player must then look up his or her
own payoffs for that column to select a row. Thus, a level-
2 player should ﬁrst examine the other player’s payoffs and
then examine one column of his or her own payoffs. A
level-3 player ﬁrst examines his or her own payoffs as they
simulate the other player at level-2 simulating them as a
level-1 player. Then they examine the other player’s payoffs
for the action the other player thinks they themselves will
take. Finally, having identiﬁed how the other player will
choose, they examine their own payoffs for that action.
ASSUMPTIONS RELATING THEORY AND PROCESS
MEASUREMENTS
In the previous section, a number of assumptions relating the
level-k theory to information acquisition patterns were
implicit. Table 1 lists the most common assumptions made
Figure 1. (a) An example 2 × 2 symmetric game. This game happens to be a prisoner’s dilemma game, with top and left offering a cooperating
strategy and bottom and right offering a defect strategy. The row player’s payoffs appear in green. The column player’s payoffs appear in blue.
(b) The labeling of payoffs. The player’s payoffs are odd numbers; their partner’s payoffs are even numbers. (c) A screenshot from the exper-
iment showing a prisoner’s dilemma game. In this version, the player’s payoffs are in green, and the other player’s payoffs are in blue. The
player is playing rows. The black rectangle appeared after the player’s choice. The plot is to scale, with axes indicating screen coordinates
in pixels
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by researchers, which we review later in detail. In doing so,
we summarize previous research on process tracing in strate-
gic choice, which has focussed upon looking for process
patterns that discriminate between level-k, learning, and
rational choice models.
The least controversial assumption is that people must
view the payoffs, which are used in the model. People cannot
be making a decision using information that they have not
viewed. For example, Costa-Gomes et al. (2001) score
models as complying when all payoffs used in the model
are viewed but do not penalize a model if it fails to predict ob-
served viewings of payoffs which are not used by the model.
Some researchers make the further assumption that view-
ing information that is not required by a model is evidence
against that model. For example, Knoepﬂe, Wang, and
Camerer (2009) explored learning in normal-form games by
comparing adaptive learning models against strategic choice
models. The eye movement data show that players looked at
their opponent’s payoffs about as often as their own payoffs.
The opponent’s payoffs play no role in the adaptive learning
models, and Knoepﬂe et al. conclude that viewing the oppo-
nent’s payoffs is evidence against the adaptive models and
evidence in favor of the strategic models. Knoepﬂe et al. also
construct a hit rate measure—the proportion of ﬁxations to
payoffs required by a model. Fixations to non-required
payoffs reduce the hit rate and count against the model.
One step beyond simply measuring whether required
payoffs are viewed is to take the number of lookups or their
Figure 2. Eye movements expected in level-k theory, illustrated for levels 0–3. At each stage, relevant payoffs are highlighted in red. The il-
lustration is for a particular prisoner’s dilemma game, the fourth in Table 2
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duration as a measure of attention to that payoff. This is
common in eye movement studies of other types of decision
(in risky choice, e.g., Stewart, Hermens, & Matthews, 2015,
or in consumer choice, e.g., Krajbich, Armel, & Rangel
2010). In strategic choice, Wang, Spezio, and Camerer
(2010) tracked the eye movements of senders in a sender–
receiver game, ﬁnding that senders attended to the true action
too much and failed to take the perspective of the receiver,
who was ignorant of the true action. In another example,
Costa-Gomes et al. (2001) use the number of lookups of
the different types of payoff (e.g., the player’s versus his or
her opponents) as diagnostic of type of the player (Table 4).
Memory is a costly activity—remembering even a small
set of numbers is hard (e.g., Miller, 1956). So while a player
could simply read each payoff in the game once and then
make the decision based entirely on that memory, this is
probably not what is happening. In strategic choice, payoffs
are often revisited multiple times (Costa-Gomes et al.,
2001), just as they are in risky choice even for simple gam-
bles (Stewart, Hermens, & Matthews, 2015) and in choices
between familiar snacks (Krajbich et al., 2010). It is cogni-
tively cheaper to make a reacquisition eye movement than
try to remember.
As people reﬁxate rather than remember, the sequencing
of lookups of payoffs can be used to discriminate between
models. Knoepﬂe et al. (2009) recorded eye movements in
4× 4 normal-form games, imposing “a simple order restric-
tion requiring at least one lookup in a stage’s lookup area be-
fore lookups in the next stage’s area count as hits” (p. 396).
Johnson, Camerer, Sen, and Rymon (2002) also used weak
constraints in the ordering of lookups to test whether people
used backwards induction in a three-round sequential
bargaining game. Chen, Huang, and Wang (2011) used the
ordering of transitions to identify a player’s k level in a
spatial beauty contest.
While the previous examples involve weak assumptions
about the sequence of lookups, inferences are often made
from pairs of temporally adjacent lookups where one immedi-
ately follows the other. For example, in risky choice, consec-
utive lookups of probability and then amount within a gamble
are taken as evidence for an expected value calculation,
whereas consecutive lookups of the amount in one gamble
and then the amount in another gamble, for example, are
taken as evidence of a trading off between amounts (Russo
& Dosher, 1983; see Stewart, Hermens, & Matthews, 2015,
for a review). Similar assumptions are made in multiattribute
choice (Noguchi & Stewart, 2014). Indeed, instructing people
to trade off or calculate expectations changes the proportions
of these consecutive lookups (Arieli, Ben-Ami, & Rubinstein,
2011), which is strong causal evidence that different consec-
utive lookups result from different strategies.
Costa-Gomes et al. (2001) made use of consecutive
lookups to identify the k level of their participants. Their
adjacency criteria required that “each comparison in some
minimal set needed to identify a [level-k] type’s decision is
represented by an adjacent look-up pair at least once in the
subject’s look-up sequence” (p. 1210). That is, if a model
requires a comparison between a pair of payoffs, those
payoffs should appear next to one another at some point in
the ordered sequence of payoffs viewed. Devetag, Di Guida,
and Polonio (2015) also assumed that consecutive lookups
indicate comparisons of those payoffs in their 3 × 3 games.
CURRENT CONCLUSIONS FROM PROCESS DATA IN
GAMES
Having constructed Table 1, we can summarize the key
conclusions that have emerged from those who have used
normal-form games. Costa-Gomes et al. (2001) conclude that
Mouselab lookups and choices were most consistent with
level-1 and level-2 models, with no participants classiﬁed
as best responding either as rational maximizers. Knoepﬂe
et al. (2009) explored learning in normal-form games and
found that although the adaptive learning models ﬁtted
choice behavior best but not eye movements, whereas
level-k-like models ﬁtted eye movements best but not
choices. Devetag et al. (2015) used 3×3 normal-form games
and conclude that players are behaving as if they make level-
1 choices or select obvious focal points.
Beyond these normal-form game studies, other types of
strategic scenarios have been considered. As described previ-
ously, Camerer, Johnson, Rymon, and Sen (1993) and
Johnson et al. (2002) used lookups revealed by Mouselab
Table 1. Assumptions about eye movements in strategic choice made by previous researchers
Assumption Source
Information acquisition
For a model to ﬁt, all necessary payoffs must be viewed. Costa-Gomes et al. (2001), Devetag et al. (2015), and Knoepﬂe et al.
(2009)
Looking at unnecessary information counts as evidence against a
model.
Costa-Gomes et al. (2001) and Knoepﬂe et al. (2009)
Attention
The number/durations of ﬁxations of a payoff indicate attention to
that payoff.
Costa-Gomes et al. (2001), Johnson et al. (2002), Knoepﬂe et al.
(2009), and Wang et al. (2010)
People re-ﬁxate rather than remember payoffs. Costa-Gomes et al. (2001)
Transitions
Order—ﬁxations to payoffs involved in later stages only count as
hits if they occur after all of the ﬁxations required for earlier stages.
Camerer et al. (1993), Chen et al. (2011), Johnson et al. (2002), and
Knoepﬂe et al. (2009)
Adjacency—comparisons of payoffs appear as a ﬁxation to the ﬁrst
payoff immediately followed by a ﬁxation to the second payoff.
Costa-Gomes et al. (2001) and Devetag et al. (2015)
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to conclude that untrained players do not use backwards
induction in a three-round sequential bargaining game. Wang
et al. (2010) concluded from eye movements in sender–
receiver games that senders choose as if they have different
levels of k making eye movements consistent with those
levels (and see Chen et al., 2011, for a similar agreement in
a spatial beauty contest). To sum up thus far, perhaps one
conclusion can be drawn: under minimal assumptions, eye
movements are more consistent with level-k reasoning with
k=1 or 2 than they are with the rational model.
A second approach taken by experimenters is to compare
eye movements in strategic decisions with the eye move-
ments of control groups instructed to follow certain strate-
gies. This approach neatly side steps the issue of making
assumptions about which eye movements are to be expected
for certain cognitive processes. For example, in addition to
the analysis described previously, Costa-Gomes et al.
(2001) taught some players game theory including how to
use dominance, iterated dominance, dominance solvability,
and pure strategy equilibrium. These trained participants
made different eye movements, making more comparisons
of payoffs across a change in action than the untrained partic-
ipants. These differences suggest that, without training,
participants were not using methods from game theory (see
also Funaki, Jiang, & Potters, 2011).
ACCUMULATOR MODELS
Accumulator models have been extremely successful in the
domains of risky choice and choice between multiattribute
alternatives like consumer goods. Figure 3 illustrates a basic
but quite general model. The bold black line illustrates how
the evidence for choosing top over bottom could unfold over
time as four discrete samples of evidence are considered. The
ﬁrst, third, and fourth samples provide evidence for choosing
top, while the second sample provides evidence for choosing
bottom. The process ﬁnishes at the fourth sample with a top
response because the net evidence hits the high threshold.
We consider exactly what the evidence in each sample is
based upon in the following discussions. In the case of the
discrete sampling in Figure 3, the model is a random walk,
and in the continuous case, the model is a diffusion model.
Perhaps people’s strategic choices are not so different
from their risky and multiattribute choices and could be well
described by an accumulator model. In risky choice, Stewart,
Hermens, and Matthews (2015) examined the eye move-
ments that people make during choices between gambles.
Among the models that they compared were two accumula-
tor models: decision ﬁeld theory (Busemeyer & Townsend,
1993; Diederich, 1997; Roe, Busemeyer, & Townsend,
2001) and decision by sampling (Noguchi & Stewart, 2014;
Stewart, 2009; Stewart, Chater, & Brown, 2006; Stewart,
Reimers, & Harris, 2015; Stewart & Simpson, 2008). These
models were broadly compatible with the choices, choice
times, and eye movements. In multiattribute choice, Noguchi
and Stewart (2014) examined the eye movements that people
make during choices between non-risky goods, ﬁnding evi-
dence for a series of micro-comparisons of pairs of alterna-
tives on single dimensions as the basis for choice. Krajbich
et al. (2010) and Krajbich and Rangel (2011) have developed
a drift diffusion model that, by assuming that people accumu-
late evidence more rapidly for an alternative when they ﬁxate
it, is able to explain aggregate patterns in choice, choice time,
and ﬁxations. Here, rather than focus on the differences
between these models, we use the class of accumulator
models as an alternative to the level-k accounts of cognitive
processes in strategic choice.
While the accumulator models do not specify exactly what
evidence is accumulated—although we will see that the
Figure 3. An example accumulator model
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difference in payoffs across actions is a good candidate—the
models do make some key predictions about eye movements.
Assuming that the evidence for an alternative is accumulated
faster when the payoffs of that alternative are ﬁxated, accu-
mulator models predict more ﬁxations to the alternative ulti-
mately chosen (Krajbich et al., 2010). Because evidence is
sampled at random, accumulator models predict a static pat-
tern of eye movements across different games and across time
within a game (Stewart, Hermens, & Matthews, 2015). But
because evidence must be accumulated for longer to hit a
threshold when the evidence is more ﬁnely balanced (i.e., if
steps are smaller, or if steps go in opposite directions, more
steps are required), more ﬁnely balanced payoffs should
give more (of the same) ﬁxations and longer choice times
(e.g., Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993). Because a run of evidence
is needed for the difference to hit a threshold, a gaze bias effect
is predicted in which, when retrospectively conditioned on the
alternative chosen, gaze is made more and more often to the
attributes of the chosen alternative (e.g., Krajbich et al.,
2010; Mullett & Stewart, 2015; Shimojo, Simion, Shimojo,
& Scheier, 2003). Finally, if the nature of the accumulation is
as simple as Stewart, Hermens, and Matthews (2015) found
for risky choice, the association between the number of
ﬁxations to the attributes of an action and the choice should
be independent of the values of the attributes.
To preempt our results, the signature effects of accumulator
models described previously appear in our eye movement
data. That is, a simple accumulation of payoff differences to
threshold accounts for both the choice data and the choice time
and eye movement process data, whereas the level-k and
cognitive hierarchy models account only for the choice data.
THE PRESENT EXPERIMENT
In the present experiment, we explored the choices and eye
movements made by participants in a range of symmetric
2 × 2 games. Our approach is to build statistical models,
which describe the eye movements and their relation to
choices. The models are deliberately descriptive to avoid
missing systematic patterns in the data that are not predicted
by the contending theories, and so our more exhaustive
approach differs from the approaches described previously
(see also Devetag et al., 2015). We are extending previous
work by considering the process data more deeply, beyond
the simple occurrence or adjacency of lookups.
METHOD
Participants
Fifty-four undergraduate and postgraduate students were
recruited from Warwick University and participated for a
payment of £5 plus a further payment of up to £5 contingent
upon the outcome of a randomly selected game. For four ad-
ditional participants, we were not able to achieve satisfactory
calibration of the eye tracker. These four participants did not
begin the games. Participants provided written consent in
line with the institutional ethical approval.
APPARATUS
Stimuli were presented on an LCD monitor viewed from ap-
proximately 60 cm with a 60-Hz refresh rate and a resolution
of 1280 × 1024. Eye movements were recorded with an
Eyelink 1000 desk-mounted eye tracker (SR Research,
Mississauga, Ontario, Canada), which has a reported average
accuracy between 0.25° and 0.50° of visual angle and root
mean square resolution of 0.01° (www.sr-research.com).
We tracked participants’ right eye movements using the
combined pupil and corneal reﬂection setting at a sampling
rate of 500Hz. Head movements were tracked, although we
used a chin rest to minimize head movements.
Games
Each participant completed the sixty-four 2 × 2 symmetric
games, listed in Table 2. The y columns indicate the payoffs
in £. Payoffs are labeled 1–8, as in Figure 1b. The partici-
pant’s payoffs are labeled with odd numbers, and the other
player’s payoffs are labeled with even numbers. Games were
symmetric, so the column player’s payoffs are a transpose of
the row player’s payoffs (i.e., y1 = y2, y3 = y6, y5 = y4, and
y7 = y8).
The x columns indicate how we generated the 64 games,
as follows. x1, x3, x5, and x7 deﬁne the player’s payoffs, with
the actual y payoffs generated from the x values by multiply-
ing by £10 and adding £30 so that payoffs were in the range
£0–£90. For 2 × 2 symmetric games, games can be mapped
onto a set of strategically equivalent games in two-
dimensional space (Weibull, 1995). The dimensions are
deﬁned by x1 x5 and x3 x7 (given in the second and third
columns of Table 2). x1 x5 is the difference in payoffs
available to the player when their opponent chooses left.
x3 x7 is the difference in payoffs available to the player
when their opponent chooses right.
So that we can explore how eye movements vary across
games, we varied x1 x5 and x3 x7 systematically, with
each difference taking values from {3,  1, 1, 3} creating
16 (x1 x5, x3 x7) pairs in a 4 × 4 grid. With x1 x5 and
x3 x7 set, we need to ﬁx one of x1 and x5 and one of x3
and x7 to deﬁne a game. For top 16 games in Table 2, we
ﬁxed x1 and x3 or, equivalently, y1 and y3. The green high-
light indicates the ﬁxed payoffs. Subsequent sets of 16 games
were generated using the same (x1 x5, x3 x7) pairs but
with other xs ﬁxed.
Deﬁning games in the (x1 x5, x3 x7) space is useful
because the type of the game depends on the signs of these
two differences. Dominance solvable–conﬂict games, when
x1 x5< 0 and x3 x7< 0, are dominance solvable and have
a conﬂict between cooperation and maximizing one’s own
payoff and include some prisoner’s dilemma games. Symmet-
ric coordination games, when x1 x5>0 and x3 x7< 0,
include some stag hunt (or assurance) games. Asymmetric
coordination games, when x1 x5< 0 and x3 x7> 0,
include hawk–dove (or chicken or snowdrift), battle-of-the-
sexes, and leader games. Dominance solvable–no conﬂict
games, when x1 x5>0 and x3 x7>0, are dominance
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solvable but with no conﬂict between cooperation and
maximizing one’s own payoff.
Stimuli
Figure 1c shows how games were presented. To avoid com-
plicating eye movements, the display was as simple as possi-
ble. The presentation of payoffs in a small font and circle
ensures that participants cannot read one payoff while ﬁxat-
ing another and must make an eye movement. In this
screenshot, the player is playing rows, with their payoffs
highlighted in green and the other player’s payoffs
highlighted in blue. The black rectangle appeared post-
response and indicated whether the player chose, in this case,
top or bottom. Between participants, we counterbalanced
whether the participant played rows or columns, whether
the participant’s payoffs were green or blue, and whether
the participant’s payoffs appeared in the top left or bottom
right of each cell. Randomly, for each presentation of each
game, we swapped rows top to bottom and columns left to
right.
Procedure
Participants were seated in front of the experiment computer
and eye tracker. Participants were shown an example game.
Written instructions explained how one player was selecting
rows and the other columns and how each player would
Table 2. Games used
Note: Actual payoffs in £ are given by y1 y8. The x columns deﬁne the games (as described in the main text), with the y payoffs given by multiplying by £10
and adding £30. Highlighting indicates the payoffs that were held constant, with other payoffs generated using x1 x5 and x3 x7.
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receive the payoff at the intersection of the chosen row and
column. Horizontal and vertical black rectangles appeared
(like the one in Figure 1c) to indicate the intersection. Parti-
cipants then received a practice trial and were encouraged to
ask the experimenter, who was present throughout the
experiment, any questions. Participants were told that, after
all participants had been tested, participants would be paired
up, a random game selected, and outcomes paid according to
their choice and the other player in their pair. Payments were
subject to an experiment exchange rate, and participants
could win up to £5.
Each trial began with a drift correction ﬁxation cross,
before a game appeared. Row players pressed the up or down
cursor key to indicate their choice. Column players used the
left and right keys. No information about the other player’s
choices was given. A 13-point calibration was used initially
and every 10 trials to maintain accuracy. Participants were
encouraged to stretch and be comfortable before each calibra-
tion. The experiment typically took about 30min to complete.
RESULTS
We have recoded results so that we can describe the data in
terms of a participant who was making row choices, had their
payoffs in green, and had their payoffs in the top left of each
cell and received games with rows and columns ordered as in
Figure 1b.
In the eye movement data, each ﬁxation was classiﬁed as
being to a particular payoff if it fell within a 100-pixel-radius
circle of the center of the payoff. This crude classiﬁcation
produces almost identical results to a maximum likelihood
assignment of ﬁxations to clusters for each payoff (Stewart,
Hermens, & Matthews, 2015).
Choices
Figure 4a shows how choices varied across games by plot-
ting the proportion of top choices as a function of the
differences x1 x5 and x3 x7. Larger differences make the
payoffs on the top row larger and make players more likely
to choose top. A logistic mixed effects regression that
predicts choice as a function of x1 x5, x3 x7, and their in-
teraction, necessarily including full random slopes, estimates
no meaningful interaction, odds ratio =0.99, 95% conﬁdence
interval (CI) [0.96, 1.02], but large and about equal effects of
x1 x5, odds ratio = 2.3, 95% CI [2.1, 2.5], and x3 x7, odds
ratio =2.5, 95% CI [2.2, 2.8]. Thus, the differences x1 x5
and x3 x7, which capture the strategic differences between
games, capture the differences in player’s choices across
games well.
The variation in choice proportions is large. In the domi-
nance solvable–conﬂict games (x1 x5<0 and x3 x7<0),
which includes some prisoner’s dilemma games, people
almost always select bottom. This level of defection is high,
but compared with the other games, cooperation in these
games is relatively unappealing (Vlaev & Chater, 2006). In
dominance solvable–no conﬂict games (x1 x5> 0 and
x3 x7> 0) where top is the dominant strategy, offering the
highest outcomes irrespective of the other player’s choice,
people almost always choose top. Choice proportions are
intermediate for the other games. Table 3 tracks the key
results, of which this is the ﬁrst.
Level-k choices
For each game, the level-k model predicts a choice of the top
row, the bottom row, or a random selection. Table 4 lists the
predictions for each x1 x5 and x3 x7, as predictions are the
same for games with matching x1 x5 and x3 x7. For these
games, odd-numbered levels (1, 3, 5, 7,…) predict the same
choices, and even numbered levels except 0 (2, 4, 6, 8, …)
predict the same choices.
The level-k ﬁt to the choice proportions is shown as a
dashed line in Figure 4a. To ﬁt the level-k model, we have
estimated the predictions of a mixture of different k levels.
The best ﬁtting mixture proportions were 19.5% level 0,
54.8% level 1, and 25.7% level 2. The level-kmodel captures
the qualitative pattern in the choice data quite well. These
proportions match those reviewed in the Introduction, with
mostly level-1, few level-0, and few level-2.
Accumulator choices
Accumulator models ﬁt the choice proportion effects well
too. For example, in the drift diffusion model, the proba-
bility of a choice is a logit function of the drift rate
(e.g., Bogacz, Brown, Moehlis, Holmes, & Cohen, 2006).
Here, we consider the difference in payoffs for the top and
bottom rows, (x1 x5) + (x3 x7), as the drift rate. But this is
just the form for the logistic regression used previously to
model how choice proportions varied over games, and so with
a straightforward assumption about the evidence accumu-
lated, the accumulator models account for choice data quite
naturally.
Choice times
Figure 4b plots choice time (from game onset to keypress) as
a function of x1 x5 and x3 x7. Where the differences
x1 x5 and x3 x7 have the same sign (i.e., point towards
the same row), people are faster. Figure 4c, where choice
time is plotted against the choice proportions from Figure 4a,
makes the pattern in choice times obvious: choice times are
longest for games where choice proportions are most ﬁnely
balanced, and choice times are shortest for games where
there is a strong preference either for top or for bottom.
Because, as we see next, the duration of individual ﬁxations
is pretty much constant across games and time course, this
means that choice time is extremely strongly correlated with
the number of ﬁxations per choice (r=.98, 95% CI [.95, .99])
and thus that the number of ﬁxations shows the same rela-
tionship with choice proportions.
Choice times
The most straightforward way to consider choice time
predictions for level-k is to assume that choice time is
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proportional to the number of payoffs required for a decision.
For example, Figure 2 shows that, for a level-2 decision, six
payoffs must be looked up and compared.
Figure 4d plots the number of ﬁxations predicted by level-k.
Higher levels require more lookups, and, when k=0 or 1, all
games require the same number of ﬁxations, and, for k≥ 2,
more ﬁxations are required when (x1 x5) = (x3 x7) be-
cause, in these cases, simulated strategies for the lower levels
involve the need to consider the best response to a mixed
strategy. No matter what proportions that we assume for the
Figure 4. (a) The proportion of “top” choices as a function of x1 x5 and x3 x7. The gray lines show the best-ﬁtting predictions from a level-k
model with a mixture of levels 0, 1, and 2 participants. (b) Choice time as a function of x1 x5 and x3 x7. (c) Choice time as a function of the
proportion of “top” choices. (d) Predictions of a level-k model for the number of ﬁxations required for a decision. (e) Absolute difference in
top-row and bottom-row payoffs. (f) Do x1 x5 and x3 x7 match in sign? Error bars are 95% conﬁdence intervals
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different levels of k, the level-k model fails to capture the
pattern in the choice time data, as noted in Table 3.
Accumulator choice times
In accumulator models, choices take longer when the evi-
dence for each alternative is more ﬁnely balanced. In the pre-
vious discussions, we considered a drift rate of (x1 x5) +
(x3 x7) to explain the choice data. Rearranged, the drift rate
is (x1 + x3) (x5 + x7), which is the top payoffs less the bot-
tom payoffs. The absolute value of this difference is plotted
in Figure 4e. Zero differences, when evidence is most ﬁnely
balanced, are plotted at the top, because these should corre-
spond to the slowest times. Larger differences, when the
evidence clearly points in one direction, are plotted at the
bottom, because these should be faster. But a modiﬁcation
of this prediction is informative. Figure 4f notes whether
the differences x1 x5 and x3 x7 have the same sign or
not. When they agree in sign, both are evidence in the same
direction—either both point to a top choice or both point to a
bottom choice. When they differ in sign, one comparison
favors a top-row choice, and the other favors a bottom-row
choice. People should be faster when signs match, and so
matching has been plotted at the bottom of the plot. By
collapsing together x1 x5 and x3 x7 differences of the
same sign—for this is the difference between Figure 4e and
4f—the qualitative pattern is choice time predictions quite
close to the data in Figure 4b.
Fixation durations
The average duration of a ﬁxation was 290milliseconds.
Such brief ﬁxations are typically associated with automatic
rather than deliberative processing (Fiedler & Glöckner,
2012; Horstmann, Ahlgrimm, & Glöckner, 2009, but see
Su et al., 2013).
We examined how ﬁxation durations varied over games. A
mixed effects model of ﬁxation duration as a function of the
x1 x5 difference, the x3 x7 difference, and their interaction,
which necessarily included full random effects, shows that
ﬁxation durations hardly vary at all across games with unit
changes in x1 x5, x3 x7, and their interaction all affecting
durations by at most only 2milliseconds (βx1  x5 ¼ 0:2mil-
liseconds, 95% CI [0.8, 0.3]; βx3  x7 ¼ 0:5milliseconds,
95% CI [1.1, 0.1]; and β x1  x5ð Þ  x3  x7ð Þ ¼ 0:24 milli-
seconds, 95% CI [0.0, 0.5]).
Fixation durations are also constant over the time course of
a trial. A mixed effects model of ﬁxation duration as a function
of ﬁxation number, which necessarily included full random
effects for ﬁxation duration, shows that each successive
ﬁxation is only 2.6milliseconds faster, 95% CI [1.7, 3.3].
Fixation durations are important in the analysis of read-
ing, because variation in their duration indicates differences
in processing (Rayner, Pollatsek, Ashby, & Clifton, 2012).
The stability of duration here across games and over the time
course of a choice suggests constant cognitive processes
across and throughout choices.
Table 4. Level-k choice predictions
x1 x5 x3 x7
Level-k prediction
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
3 3 Guess Bottom Bottom
3 1 Guess Bottom Bottom
3 1 Guess Bottom Top
3 3 Guess Guess Guess
1 3 Guess Bottom Bottom
1 1 Guess Bottom Bottom
1 1 Guess Guess Guess
1 3 Guess Top Bottom
1 3 Guess Bottom Bottom
1 1 Guess Guess Guess
1 1 Guess Top Top
1 3 Guess Top Top
3 3 Guess Guess Guess
3 1 Guess Top Top
3 1 Guess Top Top
3 3 Guess Top Top
Table 3. A summary of key results
Result Level-k Accumulator
Higher top-row payoffs increase top-row choices. ✓Good ﬁt ✓Good ﬁt
Choices take longer, the closer choice proportions
are to .5.
✕Only predicts that games requiring
a mixed strategy (where (x1 x5) =
 (x3 x7)) take longer
✓Predicts that games where the signs of x1 x5
and x3 x7 agree should be faster
Players ﬁxate their own payoffs more than the
other player’s.
✓But only odd k predicts an own-
payoff bias
–No prediction
Within-cell, within-row, and within-column
transitions are all frequent, with a higher frequency
of within-row transitions between the player’s
payoffs.
✕Does not predict any within-cell
transitions. Does not predict frequent
within-row transitions between the
player’s payoffs
✓Higher-frequency within-row own-payoff
transitions follow assuming integration of payoffs
within a row to form the drift rate
Larger payoffs are ﬁxated a little more often. ✕Only predicts more ﬁxations when
(x1 x5) = (x3 x7)
–No prediction
A bias to ﬁxate the payoffs on the ultimately
chosen row develops over the course of a choice.
✕No gaze bias ✓The gaze bias is a signature effect in
accumulator models
Transitions to a row predict choice of that row … ✕ Predicts that transitions are
independent of choice
✓Assuming evidence for an option is accumulated
at a higher rate when that option is ﬁxated
… whether or not they are informative. ✕Predicts that dumb transitions are
not informative
✓Assuming evidence for an option is accumulated
at a higher rate when that option is ﬁxated
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Fixation and transition frequencies
Immediately in the following text, we describe the pattern of
ﬁxation and transition frequencies. Afterward, we present a
statistical estimation conﬁrming this pattern. The mean,
across participants, of the number of ﬁxations made per game
is 17, which is enough to ﬁxate each payoff about twice.
Figure 5a displays the frequencies of ﬁxations to each payoff
and the frequencies of transitions between those payoffs. The
area and blackness of the circles at each payoff are propor-
tional to the frequency of ﬁxation, and the larger darker
circles for y1, y3, y5, and y7 compared with y2, y4, y6, and y8
indicate that players ﬁxate their own payoffs a little more
often than the other player’s. We note this in Table 3.
Two types of transition: common and rare
The thickness and blackness of the arrows in Figure 5a are
proportional to the frequency of transitions between payoffs.
It is useful to consider two categories of transition we will
call common and rare—theory agnostic labels based on fre-
quency. Common transitions involve exactly one change in
either the payoff’s owner (e.g., y1→ y2), the player’s action
(e.g., y1→ y5), or other player’s action (e.g., y1→ y3).
Figure 5b repeats Figure 5a, displaying only the common
transitions and omitting the rare transitions. Rare transitions
involve multiple changes (e.g., y1→ y8, where the payoff
owner and both actions change). Common transitions make
up 76% of all transitions; rare transitions are the remaining
24%. On average, any given common transition is 5.3 times
more frequent than any given rare transition.
Common transitions could be useful comparisons. For
example, transitions within a cell where only the owner of
the payoff changes (e.g., y1→ y2) could be useful if people
have other-regarding preferences. Transitions where only the
player’s action changes (e.g., y1→ y5) could be useful for
calculating the difference in payoffs for each row. Transitions
where only the other player’s action changes (e.g., y1→ y3)
contain information about how the player’s payoff changes if
the other player switches action. It is harder to tell a story about
the use to which rare transitions could be put. Too many things
are changing at once. But some proportion of rare transitions is
to be expected as people switch between comparisons.
Considering the common transitions, the darker, thicker
arrows between y1 and y3 and between y5 and y7 in Figure 5b
Figure 5. (a) Fixation and transition frequencies. (b) As (a) but with rare transitions omitted for clarity. (c) Level-k predictions for ﬁxation and
transition frequencies. The area and blackness of the circles at the payoffs indicate the ﬁxation frequencies. The thickness and blackness of
arrows indicate the transition frequencies
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show that players make frequent eye movements between
their payoffs within a row. That is, players compare the
payoffs they will receive across the two actions of the other
player. Other common transition frequencies are smaller
and about equal. We note this pattern in Table 3.
A Poisson regression for ﬁxation and transition frequencies
To describe the ﬁxation and transition frequencies, we have
ﬁtted them using a mixed effects Poisson regression with full
random effects. We used 24 dummy variables to code the
properties of each of the transitions in Figure 5b. The model
is saturated—there are 24 coefﬁcients that ﬁt the 24 transition
frequencies without error. As ﬁxation frequencies are an ag-
gregation over transition frequencies, these are also modeled.
Thus, the Poisson regression provides an exhaustive analysis
of the ﬁxation frequencies and their ﬁrst-order sequential
dependence. This approach contrasts with considering only
the subset of patterns predicted by existing theories and
ensures that we do not miss any systematic pattern. Stewart,
Hermens, and Matthews (2015) provide a complete descrip-
tion of this approach as applied to risky choice.
The coefﬁcients are displayed in the ﬁrst column of
Table 5 (ignore later columns for now). We have presented
exponentially transformed coefﬁcients because, in Poisson
regression, frequencies are given by the products of trans-
formed coefﬁcients. The intercept coefﬁcient of 20.64 repre-
sents the overall number of transitions made by a player.
(Summed over all 64 games, 20.64 is the geometric mean,
across participants, of the geometric mean number of times
that the transitions illustrated in Figure 5b were made.) This
means that each of these transitions is made about once every
three games.
The next seven coefﬁcients in the “Fixation Frequencies”
section of Table 5 describe how the ﬁxation frequencies differ
over payoffs. Using the variable own, we dummy coded each
region as +1 if it was the player’s own payoff and1 if it was
the other player’s payoff. The coefﬁcient for Own at 1.20
means that the base frequency must be increased by a factor
of 1.2 to obtain the frequency for ﬁxations to the player’s pay-
offs and divided by 1.2 to the frequency for ﬁxations to the
other player’s payoffs. Thus, the proportion of ﬁxations to
the player’s own payoffs is 1.2/(1.2 + 1 / 1.2) = 0.59. The
coefﬁcients for the six remaining dummies are all small, as
demonstrated by the limits of the 95% CIs, making no more
than a 3% change to ﬁxation counts (i.e., coefﬁcients are
between 0.97 and 1.03): players have no tendency to ﬁxate
any row or column more often than another (the left and top
coefﬁcients), and there is no interaction between the owner
and location of the payoff.
Table 5. Exponentially transformed coefﬁcients and their 95% conﬁdence intervals for the saturated model of the transition matrix
Note: Coefﬁcients have been exponentially transformed. Coefﬁcients with conﬁdence intervals that do not contain 1 are highlighted.
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The remaining 16 coefﬁcients in the ﬁrst column, in the
“Within vs. Between-Cell” and “Row vs. Column” sections,
describe how the foregoing ﬁxation frequencies vary as a
function of the location of the previous ﬁxation. The eight
“Within vs. Between-Cell” coefﬁcients are adjustments to
the ﬁxation frequencies depending on whether the transition
is within a cell between payoffs (e.g., y1↔ y2) or a
between-cells change in (only one) action (e.g., y1↔ y3 or
y1↔ y5). For example, the own coefﬁcient in this section at
0.83 indicates that bias described previously for a player to
ﬁxate his or her own payoffs is reduced by a factor of 0.83
when the transition is between the payoffs within a cell
(e.g., y1↔ y2) and increased by a factor of 1/0.83 when the
transition is not within a cell (e.g., y1↔ y3 or y1↔ y5). The
eight “Row vs. Column” coefﬁcients are adjustments to tran-
sition frequencies depending on whether the transition is
within columns (e.g., y1↔ y5) or within rows (e.g., y1↔ y3).
For example, the adjustment coefﬁcient at 0.83 indicates that
within-column transitions are less frequent than within-row
transitions. The 95% CIs for the others among these 16
coefﬁcients indicate that the other effects are all small. This
conﬁrms the pattern in Figure 5b described previously:
transitions across columns are more frequent than transitions
within cells or transitions across rows. Devetag et al. (2015)
also ﬁnd this result.
Table 5 omits the coefﬁcients for modeling the transitions
in our rare category, which involve more than one change
(e.g., y1↔ y4 or y1↔ y8). We did not ﬁnd any notable
patterns in the coefﬁcients we have omitted.
Level-k ﬁxations and transitions
Figure 5c gives the ﬁxation and transition frequencies
predicted by level-k. For the ﬁxation frequency predictions,
we assumed that each payoff required at each stage is looked
up once. For the transition frequency predictions, we as-
sumed that all transitions across rows or columns (but not
both) within a stage, in any order, are possible. For example,
for the k=2 case in Figure 2, we assume that all transitions
between the other player’s payoffs are possible in the stage
“Simulate level 1” (i.e., y2↔ y4, y2↔ y6, y4↔ y8, and
y6↔ y8), and then all transitions between the level-1 choice
column are possible in the stage “Respond to level-1 choice”
(i.e., y3↔ y7). Thus, we do not make assumptions about
adjacency as strong as those of Devetag et al. (2015) and
Costa-Gomes et al. (2001), because we are allowing any or-
dering of ﬁxations between payoffs within a stage of level-k
reasoning. Source code is available.
Figure 5c shows that level-k does predict an own-payoff
bias when k is odd. When k is even, the bias reverses. But,
because in ﬁtting choice data, the proportion of level-1
required was higher than the proportion of level-2, level-k
predicts a net bias to ﬁxate own payoffs more. So although
the model could also predict the reverse bias, we have logged
this as a success for level-k in Table 3.
Figure 5c also shows that the level-k model, or any blend
of level-ks, misses the pattern of transitions. First, the model
never predicts within-cell transitions (there are no diagonal
arrows). The within-cell transitions suggest incorporating
with other-regarding preferences in the level-k model.
Second, the model does not predict the higher frequency of
between-column transitions between the player’s own
payoffs.
Accumulator models and ﬁxations and transitions
In ﬁtting choice and choice time data, we assumed a drift rate
based on the difference in the payoffs in each row of
(x1 x5) + (x3 x7). So we would expect the player’s payoffs
to be ﬁxated equally often. It is less clear how a bias to ﬁxate
the player’s own payoffs more than the other player’s
follows. Because the games are symmetric, the information
in x1, x3, x5, and x7 is repeated in the other player’s payoffs,
and so any bias is consistent with our earlier assumptions.
We log no clear prediction in Table 3.
Do ﬁxation counts and transition probabilities change as
payoffs change?
The “Game Interactions” columns in Table 5 show how the
ﬁxation and transition frequencies change across games as
x1 x5 and x3 x7 vary. We constructed a second mixed
effects Poisson regression including (x1 x5), (x3 x7),
(x1 x5) × (x3 x7), and their interactions with the original
24 dummy variables. The payoff differences were scaled so
that coefﬁcients represent the effect of payoff differences
changing from minimum to maximum. The top Intercept
row with coefﬁcients 0.92, 0.97, and 0.58 shows how the
number of ﬁxations varied across games. Some games have
nearly twice as many ﬁxations as others. Because ﬁxation
counts are so highly correlated with choice time, as we
described earlier, we have already seen this effect as games
with more ﬁnely balanced choice proportions taking longer
and thus more ﬁxations (recall Figure 4b). In particular, the
0.58 coefﬁcient indicates that when x1 x5 and x3 x7 are
either both large (+3) or both small (3), choices are fast
because both differences point in the same direction.
The remaining coefﬁcients in the “Fixation Frequencies”
rows of the “Game Interactions” columns indicate how the
distribution of ﬁxations varies across games. The coefﬁcients
are all small, and the limits of the 95% CIs mean that we can
say that variations in x1 x5 and x3 x7 made no more than a
10% difference in ﬁxation counts. The Own, Top, and Left
rows show that players looked a little more at larger payoffs.
There is also a tendency for players to look more at the lead-
ing diagonal when x1 x5 and x3 x7 were either both large
or both small. But to a ﬁrst approximation, players ﬁxated
payoffs equally often across games.
The coefﬁcients in the “Within- vs. Between Cell” and
“Row vs. Column” rows of Table 5 describe how transition
frequencies vary across games. All of these interactions are
small, typically making no more than a 10% difference in
transition counts. For example, we have already seen that
players are less likely to make transitions to their own
payoffs if the transition is within a cell rather than across
rows or columns (see the foregoing discussions; the 0.83
coefﬁcient in the Own row of the “Within- vs. Between Cell”
section). The 0.87 value for the interaction of the Own
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dummy and (x1 x5) × (x3 x7), which appears in the
“Within- vs. Between Cell” rows of the (x1 x5) × (x3 x7)
column, indicates that this effect is even stronger when
x1 x5 and x3 x7 agree in sign. But the overall pattern is
for only small variation in transition frequencies across
games. To sum up how eye movements vary across games,
players make nearly twice as many eye movements on some
games compared with others, but the type of eye movements
they make changes very little across games—players just do
more of the same eye movements on more balanced games.
Do ﬁxation counts and transition probabilities change
over the time course of a single trial?
The ﬁnal columns headed “Gaze Bias Interactions” of Table 5
evaluate how ﬁxations and transitions depend on what peo-
ple ultimately choose and how this effect emerges over the
time course of a trial. We ran a third Poisson regression with
dummy variables indicating whether a transition was in the
ﬁrst or second half of the ﬁxation sequence, whether the
choice was top row or bottom row, their interaction, and
the interactions with the original 24 dummy variables. The
Intercept row is uninteresting and just indicates that there
are more ﬁxations in the second half of a trial (because the
middle ﬁxation was arbitrarily assigned) and slightly more
trials where the top action was selected. The only effect in
the “Fixation Frequencies” section is that people make more
ﬁxations to the payoffs in the row that they ultimately choose
and that this pattern develops over time. Figure 6a indicates
this clearly. The last panel plots the proportion of ﬁxations
to the top payoffs as a function of time conditioned by the
action chosen. On trials where top is ultimately chosen, a
bias for top locations develops from about halfway through
a trial. Similarly, a bias against top locations (i.e., for bottom
locations) develops if bottom is ultimately chosen. This is the
classic gaze bias effect (Fiedler & Glöckner, 2012; Shimojo
et al., 2003; Stewart, Hermens, & Matthews, 2015), noted
in Table 3. Other biases are much smaller.
The sections “Within- vs. Between Cell” and “Row vs.
Column” show exactly which transitions change in fre-
quency to create the overall gaze bias. Breaking the gaze
cascade effect down into transitions, when top is ultimately
chosen, the transitions that increase are the top-row transi-
tions, and the transitions that decrease are the bottom-row
transitions.
Level-k and the gaze bias effect
Level-k does not predict the gaze bias effect. Figure 6b plots
the sequence of ﬁxations predicted by level-k, which were
calculated by simulating out the process in Figure 2 and
plotting out ﬁxation location over time as a function of the
chosen row. In level-k, for all k>0, the last pair of ﬁxations
is across rows. This means that level-k is predicting no over-
all bias for the top or bottom row in the last two ﬁxations,
which is not consistent with the bias to ﬁxate the ultimately
chosen row being strongest at this point. We note this in
Table 3.
Accumulator models and the gaze bias effect
Mullett and Stewart (2015) demonstrated that the gaze bias
effect is a signature of accumulator models with a
difference-based stopping rule. For example, to reach the
threshold for an option in a drift diffusion model, a run of
evidence is needed for one option over the other. Under the
assumption that evidence is accumulated at a higher rate for
the ﬁxated option (Krajbich et al., 2010), this means that
when conditioned on choice, there should be a run of ﬁxa-
tions to the attributes of the chosen option leading up to the
choice. Thus, as we note in Table 3, the gaze bias effect is
an inevitable prediction of the accumulator models, provi-
ding that a difference-based stopping rule is used.
Differences between row and column players
We have also explored the differences in the transitions made
by row versus column players (which we counterbalanced
between participants) by including a dummy variable for
orientation and interactions with this dummy in the Poisson
regression. The only notable difference is that, for between-
cell transitions, players like to make more horizontal than
vertical eye movements, which means that row players make
more transitions across the actions of the other player than
column players do.
Choice from eye movements
Because we expect eye movements to be related to cognitive
processing, we expect there to be an association between the
choice that people ultimately make and their eye movements
(see also Devetag et al., 2015; Stewart, Hermens, &
Matthews, 2015). Table 6 explores this, listing the accuracy
with which choices can be modeled. Each model is a simple
logistic regression, ﬁtting the choice on a trial from various
properties of the payoffs, ﬁxations, or transitions. The inter-
cept model describes the fact that 56% of choices were top.
The attributes model uses x1 x5, x3 x7, a dummy for
which of the xs was the base pair, and all of the interactions
between these to ﬁt choices. The model allows separate
coefﬁcients for each level of x1 x5 and x3 x7 (rather than
a single slope), effectively allowing free functional forms
for people’s sensitivity to these payoff differences and their
interactions. This model uses a separate coefﬁcient for each
of the 64 games. No other choice model could do better. This
model achieves an accuracy of 80.0%. But this ﬂexibility is
not warranted—a model with only single slope coefﬁcients
for x1 x5 and x3 x7 and no interactions (i.e., choice∼ 1+
(x1 x5) + (x3 x7), where (x1 x5) and (x3 x7) entered as
numerical and not factors)—achieves accuracy of 79.6%,
and is preferred by Schwartz’s Bayesian information crite-
rion (BIC). Note that BIC values were corrected for the
nesting of choices within subjects.
We described earlier that the accumulator models predict
choice probabilities as a logit function of drift rates. That
the aforementioned simple logit model, with only x1 x5
and x3 x7 and no interactions, is preferred over the much
more complicated model means that the choice data do not
support assuming anything more complicated than the
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difference in payoffs between rows is driving the evidence
accumulation.
The ﬁxations model uses only the counts of ﬁxations to
each location to ﬁt choice and achieves accuracy of 67.3%.
Figure 7a plots the best-ﬁtting coefﬁcients. Fixations to
top-row locations increase the likelihood of a top choice.
Fixations to bottom-row locations increase the likelihood of
a bottom choice. Actually, an improper model, where all
coefﬁcients are constrained to take the same magnitude
(i.e., choice∼ 1+ I((F1 +F2 +F3 +F4) (F5 +F6 +F7 +F8)),
where the I() identity function aggregates the difference in
ﬁxations so that a single slope is used in this model), achieves
66.9% accuracy, and is preferred by BIC. In essence, all that
matters is how often participants looked at the top versus the
bottom locations.
The attributes and ﬁxations model ﬁts better than either
the attribute model or the ﬁxations models and is preferred
by BIC demonstrating that combining eye movement data
with payoff data improves the ability to ﬁt choices.
The last ﬁxation model uses only the location of the last
ﬁxation and ﬁts choices with accuracy 70.0%. Recall from
the discussion of the gaze bias effect that people have an
Figure 6. (a) The development of a bias towards ﬁxating own, left, and top payoffs over time by choice. Fixations were binned into deciles,
with early ﬁxations in the ﬁrst bin and the ﬁxations at choice in the last. (b) Level-k predictions for the gaze bias effect. Rows plot predictions
for different levels of k. Columns break predictions down by the predicted choice
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emerging tendency to ﬁxate the row that they ultimately
choose. Note that the ﬁxations model, which does not have
any information about the ordering of ﬁxations, is doing only
slightly worse in accuracy.
The transitions model uses the transition frequencies for
each trial to ﬁt the choice on that trial. The model achieves
71.1% accuracy and, despite its extra complexity, is preferred
by BIC over the ﬁxations model (but not the really simple last
ﬁxation model, which does nearly as well in terms of accu-
racy). Figure 7b plots the coefﬁcients for each transition.
The size of a coefﬁcient is the effect of one transition of that
type on the likelihood of a top-row choice, and transitions
with a stronger effect are drawn with thicker arrows. Color
indicates the direction of the effect. It is the between-row
transitions that matter (within-row and within-cell transitions
have very small coefﬁcients). Including only the between-row
transitions gives an accuracy of 64.9%. And improper
modeling, where between-row coefﬁcients are constrained
to have the same magnitude (i.e., choice∼1þ I T51þðð T61 þ
T71 þ T81 þ T52 þ T62þ T72þ T82 þ T53 þ T63 þ T73 þ
T83 þ T54 þ T64 þ T74 þ T84Þ  T15 þ T25 þ T35þðð T45 þ
T16 þ T26 þ T36 þ T46 þ T17 þ T27 þ T37 þ T47 þ T18 þ
T28 þ T38 þ T48ÞÞÞÞ;ﬁts nearly as well with an accuracy of
62.9% and is preferred by BIC because of its increased
simplicity. Note that the transitions that are important for
ﬁtting are the between-row transitions, but the transitions that
increased over time to give the gaze bias effect described pre-
viously were the within-row transitions for the selected row.
We have also taken into account the association between
the difference in between-row transition counts and the loca-
tion of the last ﬁxation. For example, if starting from the top
row, the number of transitions to the top row from the bottom
row minus the number of transitions to the bottom row from
the top row must, necessarily, be 0 or 1. When the differ-
ence is 0, one is back where one started, and so the last
ﬁxation must be to the top row. When the difference is 1,
the last ﬁxation must be to the bottom row. By simply enter-
ing the last ﬁxation into the regression before the transition
frequencies, we have corrected the transition frequency
coefﬁcients for the last ﬁxation. Although the coefﬁcients
are all a little smaller in magnitude, the pattern in Figure 7b
remains.
Overall, transitions to a row increase the likelihood of a
choice of that row (coefﬁcients for transitions to y1 y4 are
positive; coefﬁcients for transitions to y5 y8 are negative).
An interesting feature of the corrected coefﬁcients (and the
uncorrected coefﬁcients) is that many rare-category transi-
tion frequencies are associated with the choice even though
the comparison they are associated with is uninformative.
For example, y1↔ y6 transitions involve a swap between
payoffs for the player and the other player and simulta-
neously a swap of action by the player. Even though this
direct comparison is not informative for strategy selection,
it is associated with choice. Of the 15 transitions, which have
a strong effect on choice, 11 are rare-category transitions.
It is useful to consider how much of the variance in
choices is ﬁtted by attribute values alone, transitions alone,
and by both together. The Nagelkerke pseudo-R2 measure
is used because it is additive, with a value of zero indicating
that no variance is explained and a value of one indicating
that choices are perfectly ﬁtted. The Nagelkerke R2 values
are reported in Table 6. For the attribute model, Nagelkerke
R2=.56. For the transitions model, Nagelkerke R2=.27. If
attributes and transitions were each making a unique contri-
bution, the combined Nagelkerke R2 would therefore be .56
+.27=.83, .17 higher than the actual Nagelkerke R2=.66 for
the transitions and attributes model. This means that about
two-thirds (.17/.27) of the variance explained by transitions
is also explained by attribute values. Or, equivalently, about
one-third (.17/.56) of the variance explained by attribute
values is also explained by transitions. Using the ﬁxations
models instead, we can say that about one-sixth of the varia-
tion in choice explained by attributes is explained by ﬁxa-
tions, and two-thirds of the variation in choices explained
by ﬁxations is also explained by attribute values. So some,
but by no means all, of the processing of payoffs is picked
Table 6. Accuracy with which choices can be ﬁtted based on choice attributes, eye movements, or both
Model Accuracy BIC Nagelkerke R2
Intercept .56 4658 .00
choice ∼1
Attributes .80 3085 .56
choice ∼1 + (x1 x5) * (x3 x7) * base
Fixations .67 4285 .15
choice ∼1 +F1 +F2 + · +F8
Attributes and ﬁxations .83 2928 .60
choice ∼1 + (x1 x5) * (x3 x7) * base +F1 +F2 + · +F8
Last ﬁxation .70 4094 .21
choice ∼1 +Flast
Transitions .71 4112 .27
choice ∼1 +T12 + T13 + · · + T78
Transitions and attribute values .85 2835 .66
choice ∼1 + (x1 x5) * (x3 x7) * base + T12 + T13 + · +T78
Note: Schwartz’s Bayesian information criterion (BIC) values are corrected for the nesting of choices within subjects. The BIC values show that better ﬁtting
models do provide a better account of the data and that the extra model parameters are warranted. In the R-style regression equations, choice is a dummy variable
for top versus bottom, 1 indicates that an intercept was included, payoff differences (x1 x5) and (x3 x7) were included as factors so that they were coded with
a dummy for each payoff difference, base is a set of dummies indicating which quarter of Table 2 games came from,* indicates main effects of each term and
interactions, Fi is the frequency of ﬁxations to payoff i, and Tij is the frequency of transitions from payoff i to j.
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up by eye movements. And some of the effect of eye move-
ments has an effect on choice independent of the attribute
values.
THE INTERACTION BETWEEN EYE MOVEMENTS
AND PAYOFFS IN FITTING CHOICES
The last thing that we explored was whether the effect on an
eye movement on choice varied depending on the magnitude
of the payoff ﬁxated. In risky choice, Stewart, Hermens, and
Matthews (2015) surprisingly found that this was not the
case: looking at larger or more probable payoffs had the
same effect as looking at smaller or less likely payoffs. Here,
we ﬁnd that ﬁxation frequency×payoff value interactions are
small. Including the interaction in the attributes and ﬁxations
model improves accuracy in ﬁtting choices by 0.6%, although
this small improvement is preferred by BIC. Because the
cumulative effect of these interactions is only a very small
improvement in accuracy, we do not discuss it further.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Our participants played a set of 2 × 2 symmetric games
where the payoffs were systematically varied to create
dominance-solvable games and symmetric- and
asymmetric-coordination games, including prisoner’s di-
lemma, stag hunt, and hawk–dove games. We tracked partic-
ipants’ eye movements while they chose and explored
whether and how eye movements varied within the time
course of a choice and across the different types of games.
In a second wave of modeling, we explored the relationship
between eye movements and choice. We close with a sum-
mary of the core results and their implications for the
level-k and accumulator models.
Our players were very sensitive to the type of game
presented, with choice proportions varying over a large range
and systematically with the payoffs. Players clearly engaged
with our games and differentiated between games in their
choice behavior. A level-k model that assumed a mixture of
levels 0, 1, and 2 participants (or strategies within a partici-
pant) captured much of the variation in choice proportions.
But the accumulator model, which predicted choice propor-
tions as a logistic function of the difference in payoffs across
rows, also ﬁtted well.
Choice times were very strongly related to choice propor-
tions, such that for games where the difference in payoffs
across rows was more ﬁnely balanced, choice proportions
were nearer 0.5, and choice times were much longer. This
pattern is ubiquitous (e.g., Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993;
Mosteller & Nogee, 1951; Petrusic & Jamieson, 1978). The
level-k model is unable to predict this choice time pattern,
but it is a natural consequence of the accumulator framework
in which ﬁnely balanced evidence means lower drift rates
and thus longer times to threshold.
Individual ﬁxation durations were brief, about 290milli-
seconds, and unaffected by the game in question. Such brief
ﬁxations are typically associated with automatic processing
as in accumulator models. But brief ﬁxations are not consis-
tent with a literal deliberative calculation of strategy as
assumed by the level-k and rational models.
The stability of ﬁxation duration over the time course of a
choice together with the stability of the pattern of eye move-
ments over the time course does not offer any evidence of
changes in cognitive processing over time. This suggests, for
example, that there is not a reading phase (which would be
associated with relatively brief ﬁxations) followed by a delib-
erative calculation phase (which would be associated with
slower ﬁxations). Instead, this stability is more consistent with
a constant processing over time, as in accumulator models.
Within a game, each payoff is ﬁxated equally often,
except for a small bias towards ﬁxating one’s own payoffs
Figure 7. (a) Coefﬁcients for ﬁtting choices from the number of
ﬁxations to each region. Red indicates positive coefﬁcients (top
choices more likely), and black indicates negative coefﬁcients
(bottom choices more likely). The area of the circles indicates the
magnitude of the coefﬁcients. (b) Coefﬁcients for ﬁtting choices
from the number of transitions between regions. The width of the
arrows indicates the magnitude of the coefﬁcients
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rather than the other players (also found by Devetag et al.,
2015; Hristova & Grinberg, 2005; Knoepﬂe et al., 2009;
Tanida & Yamagishi, 2010; Wang et al., 2010). Level-k
can predict this bias for odd levels of k. The accumulator ac-
count does not make a prediction as the framework does not
make a clear prediction about how attention is distributed—
although the pattern is not inconsistent with the model.
The pattern of eye movements varied only a little across
games with a small bias to ﬁxate the larger payoffs. Devetag
et al. (2015) also only ﬁnd small differences across games
and Stewart, Hermens, & Matthews, 2015 see this in risky
choice. The level-k and accumulator models do not predict
that larger payoffs will be ﬁxated more.
Transitions between payoffs—that is breaking the ﬁxa-
tions down contingent upon the immediately preceding ﬁxa-
tion—reveal that people are making the eye movements that
have been associated with the meaningful comparison of
payoffs (Arieli, Ben-Ami, & Rubinstein, 2009a, 2009b;
Costa-Gomes et al., 2001; Knoepﬂe et al., 2009). By far,
the most frequent transitions are within a cell comparing
the player’s payoff with the other player’s payoff, or are
vertical eye movements comparing a pair of corresponding
payoffs when the player swaps from top to bottom, or are
horizontal eye movements comparing a pair of payoffs when
the other player swaps between left and right. We called
these the common transitions. Transitions where more than
one of these things changes at once were rare. We argued
that, because common transitions contain useful information,
their high frequency seems like strong evidence that players
understood the games and what sorts of comparisons might
be useful in solving them.
Within the common transitions, transitions between the
player’s own payoffs under a change of action by their oppo-
nent were particularly frequent (see also Devetag et al.,
2015). The level-k model was unable to predict this and also
fails to predict within-cell transitions. The pattern is not
inconsistent with the accumulator model driven by the net
difference in payoffs between rows.
Over the time course of a choice, the pattern of eye move-
ments is quite stable. Devetag et al. (2015) report stability in
3 × 3 games, and Funaki et al. (2011) report stability in
three-person dictator games. An exception to the stability
of eye movements over time is the developing bias to ﬁxate
the payoffs of the row ultimately chosen, which emerged
from about halfway through a choice. This gaze bias effect
is ubiquitous and is seen in choice between consumer prod-
ucts, risky gambles, and even in choosing between attractive
faces (Fiedler & Glöckner, 2012; Krajbich et al., 2010;
Shimojo et al., 2003; Stewart, Hermens, & Matthews,
2015). The level-k model predicts no gaze bias effect, be-
cause the last two ﬁxations are always a between-row com-
parison of a pair of payoffs as the participant ﬁnally selects
a row choice given their inference about the other player’s
column choice. But the gaze bias effect is a signature of an
accumulator model with a difference-based stopping rule
(Mullett & Stewart, 2015).
The small differences in eye movements across games are
sufﬁcient to ﬁt choices reliably (see also Devetag et al.,
2015). Using the size of the payoffs and no eye movement
information allows choices to be ﬁtted with about 80% accu-
racy. Using eye movement information and no payoff infor-
mation allows choices to be ﬁtted with about 70% accuracy.
Together, eye movements and payoff information allow
accuracy of about 85%. Fixations to the top row increase
the probability of choosing the top row, and ﬁxations to the
bottom row decrease the probability of choosing the top
row. Constraining all ﬁxations to be equally predictive ﬁts
the data almost as well as allowing each type of ﬁxation a
different weighting—and this indicates that it is just the num-
ber of times the top row is ﬁxated compared with the bottom
row that matters. Breaking ﬁxations into transitions, it is the
between-row transitions that matter. Transitions ending on
the top row increase the probability of choosing the top
row, and transitions ending on the bottom row decrease the
probability of choosing the top row. Transitions within a
row have a weak effect. Importantly, even the rare-category
transitions are associated with choices, even though these
do not obviously convey a useful comparison. So, although
people do have a tendency to make the common-category
transitions, which suggests that they are using strategically
relevant information to make a choice, actually, when using
transitions to ﬁt choices, we see that any given uninformative
rare-category transition is just as strongly associated with
choice as any given common-category transition, if not more
so. This suggests that while people may be making sensible
eye movements, their integration of information is quite
simple, with every arrival in a row increasing the probability
of choosing that row. This pattern is not consistent with
level-k or rational choice models but is consistent with a
simple accumulator model of choice where each visit to an
alternative is associated with an increased chance of it being
chosen.
CONCLUSION
For these strategic choices, the choice time and eye movement
process data contain the signature effects of accumulator
models but are not compatible with level-k or cognitive hierar-
chy models. First, choices were longer and took more ﬁxations
when the payoffs were ﬁnely balanced across rows. Second, as
a choice unfolds a bias to gaze at the payoffs of the ultimately
chosen row emerges. Third, transferring gaze to a row is asso-
ciated with a higher likelihood of choosing that row. Thus, we
argue that processing in strategic decisions, like processing in
risky and other multiattribute decisions, is well described as
the steady accumulation of evidence over time.
APPENDIX: INSTRUCTIONS
This experiment asks you to make choices while recording
your eye movements.
To help the eye tracker, it is useful to use a chin rest to
keep your head relatively still.
But please do feel free to wriggle between the choices as
necessary.
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We use a small sticker above your eye to help the eye
tracker track and compensate for your head movements.
The next screen will set up the eye tracker. After setting
up, you will see the description of task.
[The eye tracker was calibrated.]
Now, the eye tracker is set up.
The next screen explains how to make a choice during the
experiment. After these instructions, you will have one
practice game. If you are unsure at any time, please ask for
clariﬁcation.
Press the SPACE to proceed or the ESCAPE to go back.
Each game is a game involving you and involving another
participant. Each game has four possible outcomes for you
and four possible outcomes for the other participant. What
each of you will receive depends on your choice and the
other participant’s choice. An example is given as follows.
[A screenshot like Figure 1c was shown. The payoffs and
choices in the following text were adapted, based on the
counterbalancing.]
Your payoff will be one of the numbers in [green/blue]
color, and the other player’s payoff will be one in [blue/
green] color.
Press the SPACE to see the description of this game or the
ESCAPE to go back.
Throughout the experiment, you will choose [top/left] or
[bottom/right], and the other player selects [left/top] or
[right/bottom].
You each make your choice without knowing what the
other player has chosen. That is, you do not know what the
other person has chosen, and they do not know what you
have chosen.
Press the SPACE to proceed or the ESCAPE to go back.
Suppose that you choose [top] in the following example.
Your possible payoffs are [50] and [30], and the other
player’s possible payoffs are [50] and [60]. Which you obtain
will depend upon the other player’s selection.
Press the SPACE to proceed or the ESCAPE to go back.
Now, suppose that the other player has chosen [right].
Then, your payoff is [30], and the other player’s payoff is
[60].
But remember, neither of you can see what the other has
chosen. So you will need to think carefully about what you
prefer and what you think the other player will do.
At the end of the experiment, we are going to pair you up
with another participant (chosen at random) and pick out one
of the games you have played (again at random). Then we
will look up what you each chose. You will each win the
outcomes that your joint choices indicate, just like in the
example. Each £10 in the experiment is worth £1 for real,
so choose carefully. Depending on your choice and the other
participant’s choice, you can win anywhere from £0 to £9 of
real money.
Press the SPACE to proceed or the ESCAPE to go back.
After each game, you will see a “+” in the center of the
screen. If you look at it, you will then be taken to the next game.
Press the SPACE to proceed or the ESCAPE to go back.
You will now have a practice choice.
When you decide, please press the [↑/←] or [↓/→] arrow
key to indicate your choice.
You can rest your ﬁngers on these keys during the exper-
iment so that you do not need to look at your hand.
Press the SPACE to proceed or the ESCAPE to go back.
[Participants completed a single practice trial.]
This is the end of instructions. If you have any questions
or the task is unclear, please ask the experimenter now.
Press the SPACE to start the experiment or the ESCAPE
to go back.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We thank Chris Crespo, Maria Gemayel, Chanuki Seresinhe,
Justus Timmers, and Miao Yu for help running the experi-
ment. This work was supported by Economic and Social Re-
search Council grants ES/K002201/1 and ES/K004948/1,
Leverhulme grant RP2012-V-022, and European Research
Council grant ERC-AdG 295707 COOPERATION. Raw
data, R code for the analysis, and python code for the
experiment software are available from the authors.
REFERENCES
Arieli, A., Ben-Ami, Y., & Rubinstein, A. (2009a). Fairness moti-
vations and procedures of choice between lotteries as revealed
through eye movements. Unpublished manuscript.
Arieli, A., Ben-Ami, Y., & Rubinstein, A. (2009b). Tracking fairness
considerations and choice procedures. Unpublished manuscript.
Arieli, A., Ben-Ami, Y., & Rubinstein, A. (2011). Tracking deci-
sion makers under uncertainty. American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics, 3, 68–76. doi: 10.1257/mic.3.4.68
Bogacz, R., Brown, E.,Moehlis, J., Holmes, P., &Cohen, J. D. (2006).
The physics of optimal decision making: A formal analysis of
models of performance in two-alternative forced-choice tasks. Psy-
chological Review, 113, 700–765. 10.1037/0033-295X.113.4.700.
Busemeyer, J. R., & Townsend, J. T. (1993). Decision ﬁeld theory:
A dynamic-cognitive approach to decision making in an uncer-
tain environment. Psychological Review, 100, 432–459.
10.1037/0033-295X.100.3.432.
Camerer, C. F., Ho, T. H., & Chong, J. K. (2004). A cognitive hier-
archy model of games. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119,
861–898. 10.1162/0033553041502225.
Camerer, C. F., Johnson, E. J., Rymon, T., & Sen, S. (1993). Cog-
nition and framing in sequential bargaining for gains and losses.
Frontiers of Game Theory, 104, 27–47. 10.1006/jeth.2001.2850.
Chen, C.-T., Huang, C.-Y., & Wang, J. T.-y. (2011). A window of
cognition: Eyetracking the reasoning process in spatial beauty
contest games. Unpublished manuscript.
Costa-Gomes, M. A., & Crawford, V. P. (2006). Cognition and
behavior in two-person guessing games: An experimental study.
American Economic Review, 96, 1737–1768. 10.1257/aer.96.5.1737.
Costa-Gomes, M. A., Crawford, V. P., & Broseta, B. (2001). Cogni-
tion and behavior in normal-formal games: An experimental study.
Econometrica, 69, 1193–1235. 10.1111/1468-0262.00239.
Eye Movements 155N. Stewart et al.
© 2015 The Authors. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. J. Behav. Dec. Making, 29, 137–156 (2016)
DOI: 10.1002/bdm
Devetag, G., Di Guida, S., & Polonio, L. (2015). An eye-tracking
study of feature-based choice in one-shot games. Experimental
Economics, 10.1007/s10683-015-9432-5.
Diederich, A. (1997). Dynamic stochastic models for decision mak-
ing under time constraints. Journal of Mathematical Psychology,
41, 260–274. 10.1006/jmps.1997.1167.
Fiedler, S., & Glöckner, A. (2012). The dynamics of decision
making in risky choice: An eye-tracking analysis. Frontiers in
Psychology, 3, 335. 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00335.
Funaki, Y., Jiang, T., & Potters, J. (2011). Eye tracking social
preferences. Unpublished manuscript.
Horstmann, N., Ahlgrimm, A., &Glöckner, A. (2009). How distinct are
intuition and deliberation? An eye-tracking analysis of instruction-
induced decision modes. Judgment and Decision Making, 4,
335–354. Retrieved from http://journal.sjdm.org/9323/jdm9323.pdf
Hristova, E., & Grinberg, M. (2005). Information acquisition in the
interated prisoner’s dilemma game: An eye-tracking study. In B.
G. Bara, L. Barsalou, & M. Bucciarelli (Eds.), Proceedings of
the twenty-seventh annual conference of the Cognitive Science So-
ciety (pp. 983–988). Alpha, NJ: Sheridan Printing. Retrieved from
http://csjarchive.cogsci.rpi.edu/proceedings/2005/docs/p983.pdf
Johnson, E. J., Camerer, C., Sen, S., & Rymon, T. (2002). Detecting
failures of backward induction: Monitoring information search
in sequential bargaining. Journal of Economic Theory, 104,
16–47. 10.1006/jeth.2001.2850.
Knoepﬂe, D. T., Wang, J. T. Y., & Camerer, C. F. (2009). Studying
learning in games using eye-tracking. Journal of the European
Economic Association, 7, 388–398.
Krajbich, I., Armel, C., & Rangel, A. (2010). Visual ﬁxations and
the computation and comparison of value in simple choice.
Nature Neuroscience, 13, 1292–1298. 10.1038/nn.2635.
Krajbich, I., & Rangel, A. (2011). Multialternative drift-diffusion
model predicts the relationship between visual ﬁxations and
choice in value-based decisions. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 108,
13852–13857. 10.1073/pnas.1101328108.
Miller, G. A. (1956). The magical number seven, plus or minus two:
Some limits on our capacity for information processing. Psycho-
logical Review, 63, 81–97. 10.1037//0033-295X.101.2.343.
Mosteller, F., & Nogee, P. (1951). An experimental measurement of
utility. Journal of Political Economy, 59, 371–404. 10.1086/257106.
Mullett, T. L., & Stewart, N. (2015). Implications of visual attention
phenomena for models of preferential choice. Manuscript sub-
mitted for publication.
Nagel, R. (1995). Unraveling in guessing games: An experimental
study. American Economic Review, 85, 1313–1326.
Noguchi, T., & Stewart, N. (2014). In the attraction, compromise,
and similarity effects, alternatives are repeatedly compared in
pairs on single dimensions. Cognition, 132, 44–56. 10.1016/j.
cognition.2014.03.006.
Petrusic, W. M., & Jamieson, D. G. (1978). Relation between prob-
ability of preferential choice and time to choose changes with
practice. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Percep-
tion and Performance, 4, 471–482. 10.1037/0096-1523.4.3.471.
Rayner, K., Pollatsek, A., Ashby, J., & Clifton, C. Jr. (2012). The psy-
chology of reading (Second ed.,,). New York: Psychology Press.
Roe, R. M., Busemeyer, J. R., & Townsend, J. T. (2001).
Multialternative decision ﬁeld theory: A dynamic connectionist
model of decision making. Psychological Review, 108,
370–392. 10.1037//0033-295X.108.2.370.
Russo, J. E., & Dosher, B. A. (1983). Strategies for multiattribute
binary choice. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning,
Memory, and Cognition, 9, 676–696. 10.1037//0278-7393.9.4.676.
Shimojo, S., Simion, C., Shimojo, E., & Scheier, C. (2003). Gaze
bias both reﬂects and inﬂuences preference. Nature Neurosci-
ence, 6, 1317–1322. 10.1038/nn1150.
Stahl, D. O., & Wilson, P. W. (1994). Experimental-evidence on
players’ models of other players. Journal of Economic Behavior
& Organization, 25, 309–327. 10.1016/0167-2681(94)90103-1.
Stahl, D. O., & Wilson, P. W. (1995). On players models of other
players: Theory and experimental-evidence. Games and
Economic Behavior, 10, 218–254. 10.1006/game.1995.1031.
Stewart, N. (2009). Decision by sampling: The role of the decision
environment in risky choice. Quarterly Journal of Experimental
Psychology, 62, 1041–1062. 10.1080/17470210902747112.
Stewart, N., Chater, N.,&Brown,G.D.A. (2006).Decision by sampling.
Cognitive Psychology, 53, 1–26. 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2005.10.003.
Stewart, N., Hermens, F., & Matthews, W. J. (2015). Eye move-
ments in risky choice. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making.
10.1002/bdm.1854.
Stewart, N., Reimers, S., & Harris, A. J. L. (2015). On the origin of
utility, weighting, and discounting functions: How they get their
shapes and how to change their shapes. Management Science,
61, 687–705. 10.1287/mnsc.2013.1853.
Stewart, N., & Simpson, K. (2008). A decision-by-sampling account
of decision under risk. In N. Chater & M. Oaksford (Eds.), The
probabilistic mind: Prospects for Bayesian cognitive science
(pp. 261–276). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Re-
trieved from http://www.stewart.warwick.ac.uk/publications/
Su, Y., Rao, L. L., Sun, H. Y., Du, X. L., Li, X. S., & Li, S. (2013).
Is making a risky choice based on a weighting and adding
process? An eye-tracking investigation. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 39, 1765–1780.
10.1037/a0032861.
Tanida, S., & Yamagishi, T. (2010). Testing social preferences
through differential attention to own and partner’s payoff in a
prisoner’s dilemma game. Letters on Evolutionary Behavioral
Science, 1, 31–34. 10.5178/lebs.2010.8.
Vlaev, I., & Chater, N. (2006). Game relativity: How context
inﬂuences strategic decision making. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 32, 131–149.
10.1037/0278-7393.32.1.131.
Wang, J. T. Y., Spezio, M., & Camerer, C. F. (2010). Pinocchio’s
pupil: Using eyetracking and pupil dilation to understand truth
telling and deception in sender-receiver games. American Eco-
nomic Review, 100, 984–1007. 10.1257/aer.100.3.984.
Weibull, J. W. (1995). Evolutionary game theory. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
Authors’ biographies:
Neil Stewart is a professor of Psychology at the University of
Warwick. His research in behavioral science includes mathematical
models of decision-making, tested using laboratory, real-world data,
and ﬁeld experiments.
Simon Gächter is a professor of the psychology of economic deci-
sion-making at the University of Nottingham. His main interest is in
social preferences and in decision-making in strategic situations, in
particular in social dilemmas and related problems.
Takao Noguchi is a research associate at the University College
London. His research interests include the psychological process
of judgment and decision-making.
Timothy L. Mullett is a Research Fellow at the University of
Warwick. His interests include the psychology and neuroscience
of judgement and decision-making.
Authors’ addresses:
Neil Stewart, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK
Simon Gächter, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK
Takao Noguchi, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK
Timothy L. Mullett, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK
156 Journal of Behavioral Decision Making
© 2015 The Authors. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. J. Behav. Dec. Making, 29, 137–156 (2016)
DOI: 10.1002/bdm
